explores various facets of the very novel and suggestive interpretation of fanaticism that emerges from Hegel's reflections on the relationship between religion and the state, an interpretation particularly noteworthy, as we shall see, as an illustration of Hegel's conception of modernity. Finally, in the last part of the paper I shall present a few brief reflections on the implications of Hegel's theses for political engagement of religious inspiration.
Hegel begins his argument in the "Remark" for section 270 by recalling his concept of religion, which he first evokes in terms of its content. Succinctly put, the content of religion is absolute truth and rationality 2 , inasmuch as the "concern" of religion, Hegel explains, is "God as the unlimited foundation and cause on which everything depends."3 For the religious consciousness it is this conception of God that serves as the touchstone for the interpretation, judgement, and appraisal of all that exists.
But truth and rationality, as we learn from Hegel's account of the state, likewise comprise its content 4 ; this identity of content testifies, therefore, to an essential kinship between religion and the state. Due to this essential kinship, religious institutions and the state can, and should, function as complementary forces. And indeed, as "that moment which integrates the state at the deepest level of the disposition [of its citizens]," 5 the religious disposition ratifies the authority and legitimacy of the state, further securing the bond between citizen and state. This aspect of religion proves particularly valuable to the state with regard to those citizens who, incapable of the requisite philosophical insight enabling one to grasp the essential identity of content, could not otherwise achieve recognition of the proper relationship between citizen and state. In fact, it is for this very reason that Hegel argues that the state ought to require its citizens to become members of some kind of religious community. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 292. 4 See, e.g., p. 299 of the Philosophy of Right. 5 Ibid., p. 295. 6 Ibid., p. 295. In a note appended to the "Remark" for section 270 Hegel characterizes this function of religion as a "means to education and the [appropriate] disposition" (Ibid., p. 292). For Hegel's claim that an appreciation of the identity of content demands "philosophical insight" see p. 299.
At any rate, while a religion or church may well fail to serve the interests of the state in this fashion and may even attempt to sever every connection to the state (as we shall see below), no religious community can claim total independence, or a total exemption, from the jurisdiction of the state. To the contrary, insofar as the members of a religious community embark on wordly enterprises (e.g., actions intended to give concrete expression to doctrinal commitments) they find themselves within the purview of the state, for worldly enterprises require that one give objective expression to one's will and, as we know from the analysis of Abstract Right, only by means of property does the will assume an objective form. 7 Any assumption of property, however, immediately brings one within the state's jurisdiction. It is with the appropriation of property, then, that the religious community "emerges from the inner realm into that of wordly affairs and hence into the province of the state, thereby placing itself immediately under its laws."
8
As noted, religion and the state have the same content; there would seem to be no reason, then, for a religious community to refuse the state the attention and respect-and voluntary obedience-which it demands. However, if it is true that religion and the state possess an identical content, this content assumes distinct forms in each. This distinction of form determines their essential difference, and consequently accounts for the possibility of conflict between church and state.
The formal difference between religion and the the state derives from distinct relations to the Absolute and their corresponding forms. Again, the object of religion is absolute truth and rationality, but it has this object only "as a given content whose basic determinations have not been recognized in terms of concepts and thought."? Insofar as its relation to the Absolute subsists as this merely given content, a content "in the form of feeling, representational thought, and faith*" 10 the religious consciousness of the It should be emphasized that Hegel's proposition is not simply a prescription of opium for the people. It is not his view that the state should encourage its citizens to assume some affiliation with a religious community merely so that, concerned exclusively with an otherwordly fate, they view worldly affairs with indifference, seeking neither to influence the state's policies nor intervene in their execution. Rather, he believes the state should encourage affiliation with a religious group because religion, if "genuine"-and we shall see presently just what "genuine" denotes for Hegel-strengthens one's adhesion to the state. Whether in the end this amounts to practically the same thing is a separate question and one that I cannot pursue here. See, e.g., section 46 of the Philosophy of Right.
Ibid., p. 296; cf. p. 299. In fact, for Hegel religious communities constitute a variety of corporation; such is their "official" status vis-a vis the state and for this reason alone they remain, in the last analysis, subject to the state's laws. 9 Ibid.. p. 299.
•0 Ibid., p. 293.
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Absolute lacks the conceptual clarification and determination peculiar to the products of philosophical cognition. The state, on the other hand, has knowledge-, that is to say, its content bears the form of determinate thought and rationality.
11
Still, this formal difference alone does not entail any necessary antagonism. Rather, antagonisms between church and state arise from doctrinal contradictions.
The doctrine of a given religious community, we know, consists of the body of tenets and beliefs held by the community, the creed that informs and distinguishes its religious orientation and practices. By contrast, the state's doctrine is to be understood, for Hegel, as consisting in what it holds as "valid in relation to right" in accordance with determinations of objective rationality, and it appears "in the form of thought as law." 12 We find one manifestation of this formal distinction in the fact that religious doctrine is treated primarily in inwardness, whereas the state's doctrine necessarily achieves objective expression in the law. (One consequence of this distinction, important for some of the problems to be treated below, is that because religious doctrine belongs essentially to inwardness, because it has its province within the conscience and therefore enjoys what Hegel calls "the right of the subjective freedom of self-consciousness," 13 the state is never entitled, whatever the circumstances, to dictate or otherwise interfere with a religion's doctrine.)
Now, a religious community's doctrine may prove generally compatible with that of the state, or the two doctrines may be antithetical to each other; yet even a contradiction between the two doctrines need not necessarily engender conflict between a religious community and the state. This contingency depends on whether or not members of a religious community content themselves with the religious form of consciousness as such when they turn to the realm of society at large and the operations of the state. For while the form of religious consciousness is in itself inadequate to proper cognition of the ethical status of the state, the members of a religious community can transcend the one-sidedness of their convictions acquired in the immediacy of subjectivity. By "raising their subjectivity to cognition of the truth and knowledge of objective right and duty," they come to understand that "ethical relations are essentially relations of actual rationality" 14 , and hence are the province of the state, whose primacy in this Ibid., p. 294; p. 296. More generally, this task belongs to "the momentous transition of the inner to the outer, that incorporation [Einbildung] of reason into reality which the whole of world history has worked to achieve" (Ibid., p. 294). Cf. Hegel's comments in his "Preface" to the Philosophy of Right: "But if it is the right regard is to be confirmed and endorsed by the church's adherents in inwardness. Church members who achieve this cognition freely submit to the authority of the state, and their religious commitment serves the proper auxiliary function of religion vis-a-vis the state mentioned above.
The real source of antagonism and conflict between religion(s) and the state derives from the "shapes" that religious belief assumes when a religious community fails to assimilate the cognition of objective right and duty to its religiosity in representational form-whatever the specific doctrinal character of the latter. Such communities or churches typically proclaim "religious advice [that] altogether. In contrast with the religious devotion of a "genuine" kind which, having complemented its subjective religiosity with an embrace of the state's rationally determined principles, freely submits to the latter's authority and jurisdiction and so issues in practices in harmony with it, the communities whose doctrine remains at the level of representational thought assume a negative attitude toward the state; to the extent that they aspire to actualize their doctrines, these communities clash with the state. This thoroughly negative attitude toward the state, which Hegel terms "polemical piety", can follow one of two courses, assuming one of two expressions of repudiation. Either believers attend to their doctrine exclusively in inwardness, adopting an attitude of indifference toward the state, or they attempt to externalize their doctrine in the domain of rational objectivity, and so mount a direct challenge to the state. In both cases (i.e., with both types of polemical piety) the religious community betrays its impoverished, merely representational view of the state as an institution designed simply to safeguard property rights, security, general welfare, etc.
17 , a view that wholly ignores the preeminently ethical character of the state and its indispensability as a framework for the realization of freedom.
As an exclusively inward disposition the negativity of polemical piety generates a detachment from the perceived affairs and operations of the state. Church members so disposed display a passive acceptance of the kind of piety, it abandons the form of this [emotional] region as soon as it emerges from [the condition of] inwardness into the daylight of the Idea's full development [Entfaltung\ and manifest abundance, and it brings with it, from its inner worship of God, a reverence for the laws and for a truth which has being in and for itself and is exalted above the subjective form of feeling" (Ibid., p. 16). (As one might suspect, the series of remarks in the "Preface" from which this citation is drawn only becomes fully intelligible in light of section 270.) When, on the other hand, such a community's adherents attempt to impart objectivity to their (representationally conceived) doctrine in defiance of the state, this attitude becomes fanaticism.
Where fanaticism prevails, representational thought likewise prevails. Decisions bearing on actual existence are based on mere opinion; expressions of arbitrary will and merely subjective representations replace the objective determinations of the state. Concerned exclusively with the content of religious consciousness, fanaticism "repudiates all political institutions and legal order as restrictive limitations [Schranken] on the inner emotions and as incommensurate with the infinty of these."
19
Hence the hallmark of fanaticism-"haired of law, of legally determined right."20 Animated by a form of consciousness which knows only absolute abstraction, 2 1 fanaticism strives for a universality without determinacy, and thus an annihilation of the differences established by the state and preserved in its laws, a radical de-differentiation and homogenization.
What policy should the state assume toward these negatively disposed religious communities and their adherents? According to Hegel, this depends on which type of repudiation is involved. On the one hand, the state must tolerate "polemical piety" when this takes the form of inwardness, i.e., insofar as the religious community abstains from efforts to impart objectivity to its convictions.
22
When, however, a negatively disposed church or religious community claims authority in the purview of the state, that is to say, whenever there arises a threat to objective truth and the rational principles governing Ethical Life, the state must turn intolerant, asserting its supremacy to ensure "the right and form of self-conscious, objective rationality."
23
The state has a duty to be intolerant of opinions 18 In one of the notes attached to section 270's "Remark" Hegel refers to the Quakers and the Anabaptists as examples of this sort polemical piety (Philosophy of Right, p. 29S). At any rate, in one sense persons of such a disposition are, to be sure, not really members of the state at all, for they disdain to recognize the validity of the state's laws, and so recognize no duties to the state either. Still, insofar as they possess and dispose of property they enter the state's domain and therefore incur certain obligations to it. See p. 295 of the Philosophy of Right. 19 Ibid., p. 293. 2 0 Ibid., p. 279.
21
Ibid., pp. 37-38. It is in section 5 of the Philosophy of Right that Hegel treats this aspect of fanaticism in some detail, in the course of discussing the first moment of the will, "the element of pure indeterminacy" (Ibid., p. 37).
22
The duly of tolerance, Hegel adds, presupposes both that the state is secure enough and strong enough to exercise such tolerance, and that the negatively disposed religious communities remain small in number. In sum, insofar as it must practice intolerance toward the designs of certain religious communities the state is merely fulfilling its essential purpose: the conservation and harmonization of particular interests (including those of every variety of religious group) within the universal interest.
26 Thus, however curious Hegel's neglect of the religious question in his analysis of Civil Society or the Family, it is clear why he should choose to broach the relationship between religion and the state precisely here, 27 in a section stressing the state's two-fold role as the institution that secures the universal interest while upholding particular interests.
In concluding this brief exposition it is well to take note of the decisive inversion, as it were, that Hegel effects in the course of section 270. Hegel begins his discussion in the "Remark" by way of responding to the claim that the state rests on a religious foundation. We have seen why, according to Hegel, this cannot be so: the mode of understanding natural to religious insight and conviction is that of representational thought, feeling, the sphere of opinion-"a subjective content which therefore has no true inner force and power." Ibid., p. 290. Cf. p. 282: The principle of modern states has enormous strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, while at the same time bringing it back to substantial unity and so preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself." 27 In a note to the "Remark" for section 270 Hegel does in fact directly acknowledge the absence of a more extensive treatment of religion, explaining that "a comprehensively concrete treatise on the state" would include such a discussion, but that in the Philosophy of Right it is "the principle of the state which is expounded in its own distinct sphere and in accordance with its Idea...." (Ibid., p. 292).
28
Ibid., p. 301.
29
It is no doubt instructive to recall that Hegel himself claims, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, that "religion is the foundation of the state" (1,472; cf. p. 200 of the Lectures: "...the state must rest essentially on religion"). Yet the context do without religion, but religion that cannot do without the state, at least in this crucial respect: if it is to render itself "genuine," a religious community must integrate its own devotion with an understanding and affirmation of the state's ethical authority, and to this end it is dependent on the existence of the state. To be sure, the state benefits from the endorsement of religion, which endorsement lends further legitimacy to the state's authority. Nevertheless, in the end the state does not require this endorsement because it enjoys its own "religious accreditation," owing to the fact that its laws embody rationally determined ethical principles which have been "framed with reference to" religion. 30
*
Having reviewed the substance of the "Remark" to section 270, let us now return to one of the most interesting aspects of Hegel's analysis, namely his interpretation of the phenomenon of fanaticism. References to fanaticism appear on two different occasions within section 270, once in the course of the "Remark" itself and once in the context of the "Addition" derived from Hotho's notes. In addition, Hegel discusses the problem in the "Remark" and "Addition" to section 5 as well as in a footnote to section 258, the second of the sections relating specifically to the nature of the state. From these comments explicitly addressing fanaticism, and the thrust of his discussion of the relationship between religion and the state generally, we can distill a fairly coherent conception of the nature of fanaticism.3' of these remarks suggests that such statements should be interpreted as an affirmation, as in the Philosophy ofRight, of the essential identity of content uniting religion and the state; that is, the fact that for Hegel, "religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same-they are implicitly and explicitly identical" (Ibid., p. 452). At any rate, it is clear that Hegel's criticism in section 270 of the Philosophy of Right is aimed at those who assert a foundational role for religion while failing to comprehend the meaning which "foundation" and "religion" must have if this assertion is to reflect the insights of philosophical cognition. 30 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 299. Of course in another sense none can do without the state: "Since the state is objective spirit, it is only through being a member of the state that the individual [Individuum] himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" (Ibid., p. 276). Cf. the "Addition" to section 261: "The determinations of the will of the individual acquire an objective existence through the state, and it is only through the state that they attain their truth and actualization" (Ibid.. p. 285).
It is worth noting, in addition, that another inversion of sorts also takes place in the course of section 270, in that Hegel's analysis underscores the fact that it is not the Church that is an end in itself, but rather the state. Cf., e.g., p. 297 of the Philosophy of Right. 31 Although my account of Hegel's conception of fanaticism is based soley on the Philosophy of Right, it is well to note that the references to fanaticism in the Philosophy of Right are consistent with the few scattered remarks on this theme How, then, should we interpret fanaticism according to Hegel? To begin answering this question it is useful to recall Hegel's remarks on the nature and status of the law. The key passage in this regard is doubtless section 211, wherein Hegel elucidates the connection between Right and the law. In this passage Hegel shows that Right assumes the form of universality and determinacy only when established as law, for it is by means of laws that cognition of the principles of Right in their determinate universality are rendered objective. The state's laws therefore establish and codify objective determinations, that is, they confer objective existence on Right in itself as determined by thought rather than feeling. Truth appears in universal yet determinate form, Right becomes positive Right, through the laws.
32
As embodied in institutions and codified in law, then, positive Right fixes particular determinations, and thus limitations.
But such determinations and limitations remain utterly foreign-and inimical-to the mere immediate cognition corresponding to religiosity in the form of representational thought, or an apprehension of Absolute Truth that has not been supplemented by the ethical principles established through rational cognition. This abstract form of consciousness, the cognitive basis of fanaticism, as it were, reflects the infinity of inwardness, the state of found elsewhere in Hegel's corpus. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, for example, Hegel likewise speaks of fanaticism in connection with the elevation of an individual end to the status of a universal end: "A real purpose of this kind first appeared in Islam, where the singular purpose is raised to universal purpose, and so becomes fanatical" (Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, II, p. 438). Similarly, in The Philosophy of History Hegel equates fanaticism with a devotion to an abstract thought which negates the existent and so necessarily issues in the destruction of the concrete. Referring to the religious history of the Moslems, Hegel states that "their object was, to establish an abstract worship.... This enthusiasm was Fanaticism, that is, an enthusiasm for something abstract-for an abstract thought which sustains a negative position towards the established order of things. It is the essence of fanaticism to bear only a desolating destructive relation to the concrete.. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 294; 241. In section 211 Hegel furthermore distinguishes between a legal code which exists by virtue of convention, and as such is "merely a collection" of customary rights, "characterized by formlessness, indeterminancy, and incompleteness," and the legal code "proper," in which "the principles of right in their universality, and hence in their determinacy, are apprehended and expressed in terms of thought" (Ibid., p. 242). Insofar as even a legal code proper "may differ in content from what is right in itself," the discrepancy is due, explains Hegel in section 212 of the Philosophy of Right, to the fact that "being posited constitutes the aspect of existence [Dasein] in which the contingency of self-will and of other particular factors may also intervene..." (Ibid., p. 243).
"absolute abstraction or universality" corresponding to the first moment of the will (treated in section 5 of the Philosophy of Right), whose essential nature manifests itself in a negative freedom, a "pure indeterminacy...in which every limitation, every content...is dissolved."
33
It is the "formalism of unconditional subjectivity," 34 which not only knows nothing of, but in addition resists, the restrictions that the determinations and limitations generated by rational cognition entail.
Thus, by acting on and attempting to render objective the merely subjective representations of this one-sided religiosity, fanaticism in effect seeks to establish the objectivity of a doctrine that remains in the form of representational thought; indeed, fanaticism is the necessary result of such an undertaking. It necessarily wills abstract representations, all particularizations proving incompatible with the essential indeterminacy of representational thought. Like this form of consciousness, fanaticism strives to encompass everything within an undifferentiated totality; it represents a force that strives for homogeneity and seeks a coerced unification, identity, sameness. Hence fanaticism's pretensions to dedifferentiation and homogenization noted above. Though, to be sure, fanatics will a positive state of affairs, their exertions can only take the form of a nullification of already existing particular determinations, for the positive ethos which they envisage amounts to an order of minimal differentiation and, in any event, it is only by means of destruction that the "negative" will at the source of fanaticism attains to self-consciousness and achieves its self-affirmation. 35 Consequently, fanaticism tends to a radical, wholesale de-differentiation of the particular determinations established by reason in history and secured in modernity through the objective protection of laws that recognize and safeguard these determinations. For this reason the definition provided in the "Addition" to section 270, while perhaps ultimately unreliable, may yet best epitomize fanaticism: "fanaticism is simply the refusal to admit particular differences." 36 Not surprisingly, this disdain of difference(s) appears most strikingly in fanatics' repudiation of all laws, whose intent is, as we have seen, to secure and preserve determinate differences. In lieu of law, fanaticism would have subjective feeling "legislate." Accordingly, if and insofar as judgements and decisions bearing on wordly affairs must be made, subjective representations, caprice of arbitrary will, and opinion will prevail for, as is observed in the "Addition" to section 270, "inwardness does not develop 33 Ibid., p. 37. 34 Ibid., p. 301. 35 Ibid., p. 38.
36
Ibid., p. 304. The "Addition" to section 5 of the Philosophy of Right cites the French Revolution's Reign of Terror as an illustration of this will to dedifferentiation, since the institutionalization of the Terror meant that "all differences of talents and authority were supposed to be cancelled out [aufgeltoben]" (Ibid., p. 39).
reasons." 37 Rationality will be entirely absent from fanaticism's judgements, for while they, like the laws, possess universality, they lack determinacy.
38
One noteworthy consequence of conceiving fanaticism in these terms is that it enables us to appreciate more fully the fundamentally anti-modern or pre-modern impulse that inspires the fanatic and sustains her enterprise. As fanaticism's challenge to the state represents at bottom a challenge to what Hegel calls "the architectonics of [the stale's] rationality", 39 it amounts to nothing less than a repudiation of the distinctively modern essence of the state. Moreover, this rejection of the state constitutes but one element of a repudiation of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit)-a definitively modern articulation of social life-as such. For fanaticism shows itself no less averse to particular determinations within the other spheres of Ethical Life, not to mention the differentiation of the spheres themselves (i.e., the Family, Civil Society, the Slate). Consider, for example, fanaticism's attitude toward Civil Society. As we are reminded in the "Addition" to section 182 Civil Society, like Ethical Life generally, comprises an irrcducibly modern creation, it being the modern world "which for the first time allows all determinations of the Idea to allain their rights."
40
Yet the pretensions of fanaticism also endanger this peculiarly modern creation, owing to its repudiation of the determinations of particularity embodied in "the relationships and tasks of civil society, etc. [which it rejects] as unworthy of love and the freedom of feeling."
41
Rejecting both the determinations within the distinct spheres of Ethical Life themselves and the determinations which underpin the differentiation of these spheres, fanatics strive ultimately for a negation of Sittlichkeit as a whole, the totality of Ethical Life qua a "rational system of social institutions." 42 But if in the end Hegel's analysis succeeds in illuminating the antimodern or pre-modern impulse of fanaticism it is because in treating polemical piety (including its expression in fanaticism) in particular, and the relationship between religion and the state in general, he brings to bear his concept of modernity. Although the scope of this paper does not allow for an adequate treatment of this dimension of Hegel's method, let us at least note that he bases his condemnation of fanaticism essentially on the laltcr's tendency to contravene the central principles of his concept of modernity, 37 Ibid., p. 304.
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Cf. Hegel's remarks in the "Preface": 'That right and ethics...arc grasped by means of thoughts and give themselves the form of rationality-namely universality and determinacy..."(/ , /i//o5o/?/i3' of Right, p. 17). The distinction drawn in the text corresponds to some degree to Hegel's distinction between a dc facto legal code and legal code proper. See note 31 above. 
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AUSLEGUNG namely the principle of subjectivity or autonomy (i.e., the peculiarly modern freedom for individuation and self-determination, the freedom of particularity), and the insistence on justification and legitimation by reason.
43
As we have seen, fanaticism would annul the freedom of autonomous subjectivity by abrogating the very determinations which establish the institutional conditions of this freedom. With respect to the imperative of rational justification, it suffices to recall that Hegel's whole critique of fanaticism rests at bottom on the contention that religion, loo, requires justification by reason; ultimately it, too, must assimilate the objective ethical determinations wrought by the operation of rational thought. Likewise, Hegel ultimately condemns fanaticism for its deficit of rationality.
At any rate, to conclude our discussion of fanaticism, let us take note of two implications, or corrolarics, of this aspect of Hegel's theory, and two problems which it seems to leave unresolved. The first of these implications has to do with the singularity of Hegel's criterion for determining the "genuineness" of religious devotion. As noted above, Hegel's thesis provides us with a means for distinguishing belween proper and improper types of piety, between "genuine" and "polemical" modes of religiosity. Again, a genuine religion acknowledges and endorses the stale, having raised its subjectivity "to cognition of the truth and knowledge of objective right and duty" and thereby come to recognize the ethical character of the state and its necessary supremacy. For Hegel, a religious community's practice is "genuine" to the extent that it combines its subjective religiosity of the understanding with a recognition of the objective rationality of the stale, and so voluntarily subordinates itself to, and ratifies the authority of, the latter.
Leaving aside for the moment the fact that, by positing this criterion, Hegel ends up affirming only those religions which endorse the modern slate without reservation, we may note that Hegel's view implies that the doctrine of almost any religious group can be rendered "genuine," regardless of its specific doctrinal content, provided only thai it is raised to "cognition of the iruth and knowledge of objective right and duty." This means, however, that Chrislianity, the "religion of freedom" 44 itself and the 43 Statements of, and allusions to, these principles occur repeatedly in the Philosophy of Right. For especially prominent references to the "principle of subjectivity," see for example sections 124, 162, 185,260,299, and 316 . Regarding the insistence on justification and legitimation by reason, consider Hegel's remarks in his "Preface": "It is a great obstinacy, the kind of obstinacy which docs honour to human beings, that they are unwilling to acknowledge in their attitudes [Gesinnung] anything which has not been justified by thought-and this obstinacy is the characteristic properly of the modern age..." (Ibid., p. 22) . (Cf. section 132: "The right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational is the highest right of the subject..." (Ibid., p. 159).
decisive impetus behind the advent of modernity (due to its cultivation of subjectivity), cannot justifiably lay any special claim to "genuiness"; rather, its adherents also bear the responsibility for supplementing their immediate cognition of the truth with the objective determinations of rational thought-it, too, remains susceptible of anti-modern regressions, it too must become "genuine".
The second point that I wish to underscore is the following: One virtue of Hegel's analysis is that it shows why religious fanaticism is necessarily political in nature-indeed, is by definition a kind of political fanaticism. By showing that an externalized polemical piety tends of necessity both to dispute the state's authority and contest its very existence, Hegel provides a most plausible argument for the inevitably political character of religious fanaticism.
As for the various problems attending the interpretation of section 270, I should like to mention two, without however, venturing to resolve them. First, it is worth noting that it remains unclear whether Hegel regards fanaticism as being fundamentally an aberration of the individual or a supraindividual disorder. In other words, does the potential for fanaticism represent an institutional liability, or is it rather merely the result of a failing on the part of the individual believer? To be sure, the menace of fanaticism is in large measure proportionate to the number of fanatics, but nevertheless the question remains: Who bears the responsibility for integrating the ethical and juridical determinations of rational cognition with the religious form of consciousness, the individual or the community?
Hegel does of course often treat the issue of polemical piety in terms of "religious communities" or simply "the Church", and the general tenor of his interpretation implies that the responsibility for integrating religious insight with the concepts of rational cognition lies with the community. Yet, if it is the case that this responsibility docs fall to the community, how are we to explain the persistence of individual fanatics within one which has duly integrated its own doctrine with that of the state? In a similar vein, one must question the efficacy of assimilating and affirming the determinations of objective rationality at the level of the religious community, considering that fanaticism originates in the form of consciousness natural to religious conviction in the individual. On the other hand, the assumption that every individual adherent of a given faith or member of a given religious community bears responsibility for assimilating the rationally determined ethical principles to her or his conviction leads to two problems: first, it makes for an undue measure of contingency in the performance of this vital task; secondly, it seems to suppose greater intellectual capacities of individuals than Hegel is prepared to grant: It will be recalled that Hegel believes that all citizens should be required to affiliate themselves with some religious community or other, presumably because most citizens 96 AUSLEGUNG cannot by their own lights recognize the true authority of the state, and their proper relation to it. 45 The second problem to which I wish to draw our attention concerns the issue just mentioned, namely Hegel's suggestion that the state encourage all of its citizens or subjects to belong to some religious community, since the religious sentiment strengthens and lends further legitimation to the state's authority. Hegel maintains that any religious community will do, and that the state is therefore under the obligation to observe a policy of strict noninterference with regard to the content of religious doctrines. Now, it is well to ask whether Hegel's proposition does not produce a certain tension in his treatise, a tension symptomatic in many ways of the tension between the liberal and communitarian tendencies in his treatment of the relationship between religion and state, and his political thought generally. Given Hegel's theory of the state and in particular his concern with the conditions ensuring its viability and sovereignty, we may well wonder how he can advocate such a broad religious liberty. For, if some religious doctrines not only do not tend to reinforce the state's legitimacy, but, to the contrary, of necessity tend actively to contest it, is it advisable that the state nonetheless authorize their propagation? By doing so does the state not encourage-or in any event, fail to discourage-polemical piety? Does the state's responsibility to safeguard rationality, i.e., to uphold the rights of selfconscious objective rationality, 46 not entail some obligation to discourage, if not stem altogether, (he growth of "polemically" oriented tendencies of religious piety? Is it enough, as a countermeasure, that the state promote (through, for example, educational practices) all individuals' receptivity to its own rationally determined ethical and juridical principles? These are, it seems to me, questions that must be addressed if we truly wish to make sense of the implications of this facet of Hegel's political theory.
*
Lastly, I should like to consider the implications of Hegel's conception of polemical piety for political engagement or praxis of religious inspiration. As we have seen, according to Hegel's thesis it is in principle impossible for a "genuine" religion to propound, let alone endeavor to realize, a doctrine at odds with the slate's doctrine. (Indeed, since praxis or engagement by religious communities in the modern era? If all positive exertions of a religious community that are at variance with a modern state's juridical or institutional structuration arc tantamount to "fanaticism", how is religion to perform a progressive political function? Or docs Hegel's political theory simply preclude the possibility outright? In a word, does the relationship between religion and the state affirmed by Hegel amount to a prescription for acquiescence and servility, and therefore simply lend further credibility to the view that Hegel advocates capitulation before the status quo?
It is difficult not to conclude that Hegel's theory of the modern state does to a large extent deny the legitimacy of such religiously inspired dissidence. Yet we must bear in mind that even if this much is granted, it applies only in the case of modern states, and that even many states existing in the modern era would not qualify as modern states according to Hegel's criteria. For this reason it is worthwhile to examine the possible implications of Hegel's view with respect to pre-modern states.
What, then, are the implications for religiously motivated political engagement in those historical contexts where neither the state nor religion yet posseses a rational form? That is to say, what, on Hegel's terms, would be the proper relationship between religion and the state before the rise of the modern state? Again, both church and state rightly claim the status of an ethical authority in the modern era, but the two do not possess equal authority: the modern state enjoys ultimate ethical authority, and this hierarchy of ethical authority is due to the state's rational supremacy, the result of its rational form. But what of the past? What view would Hegel's theory imply for the past? To be sure, the religiosity of polemical piety was no more "genuine" in the past, yet it is equally true that before the modern era the state lacked the one quality, its objective rationality, which in the modern era establishes the basis for its ultimate supremacy as an ethical authority.
In short, it would seem that in the past religious communities and the state bore the same content, without cither possessing a rational form. Presumably, then, both sorts of institutions were entitled to the same ethical authority. But if this is so, then it would seem that insofar as, or wherever, a given state has yet to become rational, has yet to attain the actuality of the properly modern state, religion and the state represent the same ethical status, at least gauged in formal terms.
What does this imply with regard to polemical piety? Might it not perform a progressive function when the state exists in a less than rational form? Might not polemical piety represent a progressive dialectical counter-force wherever it reacts against a repressive positivity, understanding the latter as, in Habermas's words, "a society from whose historically petrified forms the spirit has fled, a society whose institutions, laws and constitution no longer correspond to interests, opinions, and the "religion of freedom" and foundation of modernity counseled and embodied the most potent antagonism to the conditions of (modern) freedom, by virtue of his fanaticism. In any event, if we grant the assumption that social progress and the advance of World Spirit required polemical piety, including fanaticism, in the past, it seems reasonable to conclude that Jesus's fanaticism was of this type and pardonable, even laudable, on these grounds. That Hegel's analysis affords us such insight, enabling us to appreciate Christ's political significance as the protagonist of a world-historical fanaticism, is but one more unexpected virtue of the Philosophy of Right.
